Tribunal Members

• Dara Hogan (Chairman)
• Mike Butler (HG Competitions Officer)
• Philip Lardner (Training Officer)

The Tribunal of Inquiry was appointed at the IHPA Executive Committee meeting on 16th July 2003 to report into the accident.

The Tribunal met on 18th August 2003 and reviewed witness reports and the video recording by Michael O’Brien.

Pilot: Shane O’Reilly
Glider: Airborne Climax 13m2 Serial #CL13-84 and Solar Wings Edge harness
Reserve: Standard Conical Parachute (Manufacturer TBC)
Witnesses: Mike Butler, Michael O’Brien, Jennifer Vickers, Niamh Fleming, Sharon Doherty.

Reporting: The accident was reported by Dara Hogan to the Air Accident Investigation Unit of the Department of Transport on 5th June 2003.

Pilot Profile: The pilot had ~20 years experience with >1,400 hours total airtime (~200 hours on type). The pilot was a founder-member of and flying instructor with the Mount einster Hang Gliding Club. The pilot had won numerous international and domestic flying competitions during his flying career. He was also a certified sailplane pilot and a microlight pilot. The pilot was seen to be working towards achieving a loop on his hang glider in recent months and had successfully looped the hang glider twice already in 2003.

Overview

The accident happened during the Celtic Cup HG Competition which was run over 24th and 25th May 2003 at Mount Leinster on the Carlow / Wexford border. A task was set to fly from the summit of Mount Leinster to the coast just south of Courtown Harbour – a distance of 37.2km (Irish grid reference IT19700 ITM52300). Conditions on 25th May were light, west-north-west winds (approximately 10 to 15mph) and thermic. Cloudbase was at ~4,500 feet.

The Accident

The pilot took off normally at about 1:10pm and thermalled to cloudbase straight away and remained in the vicinity of Mount Leinster for some time before he headed towards goal. He arrived over the goal field at ~3:30pm and his altitude was ~2,000 feet AGL. He was seen to spend some time losing altitude in normal controlled flight before he attempted to loop his glider from a starting altitude of between 400 feet and 1,000 feet. The video showed no cause for concern during the dive phase and the pilot went vertical and then inverted. At this point the glider lost momentum and failed to go through the inverted position. The pilot’s feet fell onto the back of the sail causing the glider to tail-slide with the pilot still holding the bar. The glider then tumbled forwards with increasing velocity through 1½ rotations from the inverted position. After the first half-rotation the pilot was unable to retain his grip on the bottom bar and the pilot was flung backwards around the trailing edge and he impacted on the top of the sail. The pilot’s hang-strap then wrapped around the keel as he fell back under the sail and from that point onwards the pilot was suspended from the keel and unable to reach the control frame.

The glider then stopped rotating and entered a steep side-slip at which point the pilot pulled his reserve handle and attempted to throw it. In the 4 seconds between pulling his reserve handle and actually releasing it the pilot made two unsuccessful attempts to deploy the reserve without letting go of the deployment handle. On the third attempt the reserve was successfully thrown clear, the inner bag immediately separated and the canopy started to fill. At this point the keel of the glider, from which the pilot was suspended, broke and the pilot swung forward into the A-frame. The pilot resumed his grip on the bottom bar with both hands but he had no pitch control because the keel was broken forward of the sail tensioning catch. The pilot was now too low at this point and he impacted the ground before the reserve canopy was fully inflated. The right leading edge and bottom bar of the glider impacted the ground simultaneously.

First Aid

First aid was immediately rendered by the witnesses and a local doctor attended the scene of the accident within 15 minutes. The ambulance arrived within 20 minutes of the accident and the pilot was taken to Wexford County Hospital.

The pilot was transferred to St Vincent’s Hospital, Dublin on 26th May and he died on 3rd June.

Damage to the Glider

The glider was examined by Mike Butler and Eamon Thompson (an experienced hang glider pilot) who found no evidence of equipment failure prior to the accident. The keel of the glider was broken in two places – 165cm from the nose (forward of the tensioning catch) and 227cm from the nose. The examiners believe that the forward break occurred in the air and de-tensioned the sail thus preventing any possibility of recovery. The rearmost break probably occurred on impact with the ground. The right upright was broken into two pieces and the left upright was bent outwards by ~15o. The bottom bar was twisted up and splayed at both ends. The trailing edge of the sail was torn close to the keel pocket by the harness hang-strap. There was no other apparent damage to the glider, the harness or the reserve.

Findings

#1: The accident was caused by the pilot’s attempt to perform a loop with insufficient airspeed to complete the manoeuvre.

#2: The pilot had insufficient altitude to recover from his failure to complete the loop.

#3: After the tumble, control of the glider was not possible because the pilot was suspended from the keel rearward of the trailing edge and unable to reach the control frame.

#4: The pilot made two unsuccessful attempts to throw the reserve without releasing the handle.

#5: Although the reserve parachute was ~20 years old and had not been re-packed recently, the parachute was in good condition and it did start to open when deployed.

#6: In common with all hang gliders, the Airborne Climax glider is not certified for aerobatic manoeuvres.

#7: There was no evidence that the pilot suffered from any pre-existing physical or mental condition that would have contributed to this accident. (This Tribunal did not have access to the post-mortem report).

#8: The pilot was highly-experienced and had an injury-free flying career going back over two decades.

Recommendations

#1: That pilots should not attempt to perform manoeuvres outside the manufacturer’s specified flying parameters for their wings.

#2: That any manoeuvres that might lead to a loss of controlled flight should only be attempted at an altitude sufficient for recovery and / or deployment of the reserve parachute.

#3: That pilots should replace their reserve parachutes before they are ten years old.

#4: That pilots should familiarise themselves with the proper reserve deployment procedure and, specifically, that they should be aware of the importance of letting go of the
deployment handle when throwing.

#5: That pilots should attend regular reserve deployment clinics (at least annually) at which their reserve parachute systems are test-deployed and re-packed.

Concluding Remarks

The Tribunal is grateful to Michael O’Brien whose DV recording and written deposition was invaluable to the Tribunal.

In closing, the members of the Tribunal of Inquiry extend their deepest sympathies to the family and friends of Shane O’Reilly.

___________         __________         _____________
Dara Hogan          Mike Butler          Philip Lardner
Chairman              HG Comps             Training

4th September 2003